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CASE COMMENTS
courts, however, refuse to take any action on an excessive sentence until
7
the valid portion has been served.2
When a court merely cuts off the excessive portion of the sentence
or defers action until the valid portion has been served, the maximum
sentence always follows without regard for the particular facts in the
case. On the other hand, when the cause is remanded to the trial
court, that court may in its discretion pronounce a valid sentence
based on a first-hand acquaintance with the merits. In remanding the
cause in the instant case, the Florida Court adhered to a sound course
followed consistently in the past 18 and now regarded as the wellsettled rule in this jurisdiction.19
JAMES E. MooRE

CRIMINAL LAW: ESTOPPEL AS BAR TO PLEA OF
FORMER JEOPARDY
State v. Bentley, 81 So.2d 750 (Fla.1955)
Defendants were charged with larceny of a cow. In presenting
its case, the state proved that the subject of the larceny was a bull.
Defendants moved for a directed verdict based on a material variance
between allegation and proof. The motion was granted and a new
information was filed charging defendants with larceny of a bull.
Defendants' motion to quash, based on a plea of former jeopardy, was
granted and the state appealed. HELD, having asserted an alleged material variance at the former trial, defendants are estopped from pleading former jeopardy on the ground that the variance in the first trial
was actually immaterial. Order reversed.
The Florida Supreme Court first applied the doctrine of estoppel
17E.g., State v. Maher, 164 Minn. 289, 204 N.W. 955 (1925); State v. Hooker, 183
N.C. 763, 111 S.E. 351 (1922); Commonwealth ex tel. Ciampoli v. Heston, 292 Pa.
501, 141 At. 287 (1928); In re Taylor, 7 S.D. 382, 64 N.W. 253 (1895); In re Blystone,
75 Wash. 286, 134 Pac. 827 (1913).
ISColeman v. State, 140 Fla. 772, 193 So. 84 (1940); In re Camp, 92 Fla. 185, 109
So. 445 (1926); Faison v. Vestal, 71 Fla. 562, 71 So. 759 (1916); Porter v. State, 62 Fla.

79, 56 So. 406 (1911).
19rollingsworth v. Mayo, 77 So.2d 843 (Fla. 1955).
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to a plea of former jeopardy in State v. Cootner, an arson case in
which the defendant won a directed verdict on the first trial because
of a variance between the allegation and proof of ownership of the
property burned. The trial court granted defendant's motion to quash
the second information. On appeal, the Court held that a subsequent trial would not constitute double jeopardy, since the new information, with a correct allegation of ownership, charged a different
crime; a conviction on the first trial would have been reversed on
appeal. The Court further stated 2 that one who asserts the materiality
of a variance as a defense is estopped on a later trial under a new
information from pleading that the variance on the first trial was
actually immaterial.
An entirely different situation is presented when the first trial
might result in a conviction that could be upheld on appeal. Such a
case was Driggers v. State,3 in which the defendant was acquitted of
larceny of a cow and was subsequently tried for the identical act
under a charge of larceny of a calf. In reversing the conviction the
Florida Supreme Court held that "an acquittal.., on a charge of the
larceny of an animal of a certain species from a named owner... will
bar a second prosecution for the larceny of the same animal, described
in-some other way.... The instant case also involved a situation in which a conviction
on the first trial could have been sustained on appeal. The trial judge
apparently overlooked the holding in Driggers v. State when he
directed a verdict for defendants; but, relying on this decision, he subsequently quashed the second information. On appeal the Court distinguished the Driggers case on the ground that in that case the defendant did not undertake to establish the materiality of the variance.
But in permitting a second trial for the same offense, the Supreme
Court relied on the authority of two Florida cases in which the variance
at the first trial was actually material.5
This decision will give rise to questions as to what positive action
by a defendant will call the estoppel doctrine into play. The trial
judge, for example, may instruct the jury on his own motion that the
defendant should be acquitted because of a material variance or he
260 So.2d 734 (Fla. 1952).
21d. at 737.

3137 Fla. 182, 188 So. 118 (1939).
41d. at 188, 188 So. at 121.
5State v. Cootner, 60 So.2d 734 (Fla. 1952); State v. Anders, 59 So.2d 776 (Fla.
1952).
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